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In 1924, Los Angeles was the largest city in the West, the largest in land area
and the fifth largest city in the United States. Tourism, a land boom, emerging
industries, and a new harbor had made Los Angeles prosper. There were one mil-
lion residents in Los Angeles and, whether native born or migrants seeking a for-
tune or retirement haven, all enjoyed and extolled Los Angeles' one unchanging
asset, its climate. With an average mean temperature in the mid-60's, an average
mean rainfall of less than 15 inches per year, and a smog free atmosphere, despite
the fact that there were more automobiles per capita in Los Angeles than in any
other city, Los Angeles was truly "the climatic capital of the world," or so claimed
its Chamber of Commerce.
Nineteen percent of the residents in Los Angeles were foreign born. There were
approximately 2,000 Chinese, 12,000 Japanese, and 22,000 Mexicans in Los An-
geles in 1924; each group settling in different locations. Chinese residents settled
in the Northeast section of the city; Japanese chose the Western part of town;
and most of the Mexicans lived in an area which straddled the Eastern boundary
of the City of Los Angeles and the unincorporated territory of Los Angeles County.
One Mexican community, bounded on the North by Alhambra Avenue, on the
West by Alameda Street, on the South by Macy Street, and on the East by the
Southern Pacific Railroad, may be found today located adjacent to the famous
tourist attraction, Olvera Street. It was in this area that 28 Mexicans and two Cau-
casians succumbed to pneumonic plague during a two-week outbreak from October
to November, in 1924.
In accordance with California statute, Dr. Walter Dickie, Secretary of the State
Board of Health, transmitted a biennial report to Governor Friend W. Richardson
in which he noted in the preamble that the "management" of this particular out-
break had represented "the most outstanding accomplishment" of California's
health officers in the biennial period beginning 1924. Certainly pneumonic plague
is one of the most frightening epidemics known to man. Virulent and swift moving,
1 Presented at a meeting of the Beaumont Medical Club, Yale University School of Medicine,
New Haven, Connecticut, December 15, 1972.
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pneumonic plague, under proper conditions, disrupts and is capable of decimating
a community as few other epidemics can. It is understandable, then, that Dickie
should take pride in the accomplishments of those responsible for containing the
epidemic. But Dickie's report, submitted almost two years after the outbreak, is
susceptible to "historical drift." In order to evaluate more properly the validity
and appropriateness of Dickie's encomium, this paper will chronicle and analyze
the events which occurred in Los Angeles, taking special cognizance of the social,
administrative, and epidemiologic features of this last major epidemic of pneumonic
plague in the United States.
I
On October 29, 1924, a physician requested an ambulance from the Los Angeles
County General Hospital for Two Mexican patients critically ill of a malady which
he could not definitely diagnose, but which he knew to be highly contagious since
several others in the neighborhood were also affected with similar symptoms of
very high fever and pains in the back and chest. The following day 13 other cases
displaying the same symptoms were detected and subsequently admitted to the hos-
pital, where they all developed signs of severe pneumonia, with bloody expectora-
tion and marked cyanosis. It was during this day, after three of the 15 patients
who had been admitted had died, that the diagnosis of pneumonic plague was first
suggested. The diagnosis was confirmed the following morning, but not made pub-
lic, when the staff pathologist performed an autopsy and reported the presence
of gram-negative bipolar staining bacilli characteristic of plague in the lungs of
one of the deceased patients (1).
The United States Public Health Service and the State Board of Health first
learned of the diagnosis somewhat indirectly. On October 31, telegrams were sent
from the assistant superintendent of the hospital to federal and state authorities
and to medical supply dealers inquiring where plague serum and vaccine could
be obtained. On November 1, Benjamin Brown, the Public Health Service surgeon
stationed in Los Angeles, having confirmed the information contained in the tele-
gram, wired the Surgeon General in code as follows: "Eighteen cases ekkil [pneu-
monic plague]. Three suspects. Ten begos [deaths]. Ethos [situation bad]. Recom-
mend federal aid" (2). The Surgeon General immediately wired instructions to
Senior Surgeon James Perry, stationed in San Francisco, to proceed to Los Angeles
where he was to investigate quitely and be certain to keep the source of his informa-
tion confidential. The Service, according to protocol and statute, did not wish to
involve itself in state affairs unless officially invited or prescribed by law to do
so (3).
On the same day, Dr. William Dickie, secretary of the State Board of Health,
read in the morning newspapers that a "strange illness" had broken out in Los An-
geles which had taken the lives of nine people and which threatened the lives of
eight others. The unnamed ailment, which was being investigated by city health
officers, resembled pneumonia but "ran its course much faster." In a wire to Dr.
Elmer Pascoe, acting health officer of the Los Angeles Health Department, Dickie
inquired: "Kindly wire immediately cause of death of Lucena Samarano." The
reply was equally polite and laconic, "Death L. S. caused by Bacillus pestis" (4).
At 1:00 a.m., November 2, the Macy Street area, which included approximately
eight city blocks and which housed approximately 2,500 Mexicans, was placed
in quarantine by the City Health Department. All cases Qf illness occurring within
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the area were examined by health department physicians and suspicious cases sent
to the County Hospital. The Los Angeles County Board of Charities provided
seven-day rations for each household and sought to establish "cubicle isolation"
for each house within the quarantine area (5). With the cooperation of the Catholic
Board of Charities, a Span-sh-speaking priest and social worker were placed in the
area to reassure and calm the anxious, residents. Public health nurses were also
sent to the area and directed to make a house to house inspection in an endeavor
to locate other cases or contacts (6).
Arrangements were made with the County General Hospital to admit all persons
who lived at addresses where pneumonic plague had occurred. A total of 114 con-
tacts were admitted but none became ill with plague. Accordingly to the state epi-
demiologist, the inhabitants recognized the highly contagious nature of the disease
and avoided intimate contact (7). Early hospitalization of cases and self-imposed
isolation were considered by the authorities as helping to contain the epidemic.
Mention was also made of the fact that Mexicans, unlike Orientals, did not attempt
to hide their dead. When seriously ill, they called a priest and, generally, were
prompt in securing aid. This one fact, it was believed, eliminated many of the diffi-
culties encountered by health officials who had been responsible for controlling
the San Francisco outbreaks of the early 1900's (8).
Upon admission to the hospital all suspected plague cases had their charts flagged
with a notation which read, "pneumonic plague," "suspected pneumonic plague,"
"suspected bubonic plague," or "individual isolation." Nurses, doctors and orderlies
responsible for the care of suspicious cases or contacts protected themselves with
a rather simple but ingenious mask device made of a pillow slip and celluloid,
gowns which fitted closely about the neck, and rubber gloves.
The plague serum which had been requested by the Los Angeles County General
Hospital and the acting health officer of the City Health Department arrived in
Los Angeles on November 5, but records reveal that it was secured in time to
be used in only one case. Moreover, there seems to have been some doubt expressed
in the reports that it would have been effective in cases of pneumonic plague (9).
Mention is made in the records, however, of the use of mercurochrome and the
subsequent recovery of two plague patients who received inoculations of this sub-
stance (10). The plague serum predictably received prominent attention by the
press and was played up in the promotional literature of the company that produced
it. In the house organ of the Mulford Laboratories, the affair was dramatically
depicted:
"Science has discovered a serum that will stop the Swath of Death and save
the lives of thousands. Los Angeles calls for help and in less than 36 hours the vials
of serum were brought to the front lines where the battle is on against the Terror.
That's the thriller. That's 20th century truth. That's the news that warms the heart
rather than chills the marrow. That's the sort of stuff that makes you glad you're
living and inspires you to be proud of your kind, of your country and of the
prosperity and enterprise which have backed experiment to the point of achievement
where such miracles are possible. And you are part and parcel of the organization
that produced this thriller" (11). (See figs. 1 and 2).
Additional measures were taken by authorities which appear prominently in the
reports. All health care facilities, such as emergency rooms and free clinics, were
instructed by the State Board to report any illness of a suspicious nature and the
42THE PNEUMONIC PLAGUE OF 1924
FIG. 1
Los Angeles County Medical Society, on the urging of the State Board, assembled
in special session to hear lectures on the etiology, signs, symptoms, and therapy
of the three varieties of plague (12).
City health officers who released the story already had a confirmed diagnosis
of pneumonic plague but chose for obvious reasons to refer to the disease, from
November 1 to November 5, as the "strange malady," "pneumonia," "virulent
pneumonia," or "malignant pneumonia." Not until November 6, when the epidemic
appeared to have run its course, did Los Angeles newspapers refer to the disease
properly as pneumonic plague and even then justified their evasion by adding that
pneumonic plague was the 'technical term" for "malignant pneumonia" (13).
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The New York Times and the Washington Post, however, were quick to headline
that pneumonic plague had erupted in Los Angeles (14). Indeed, the news blackout
was confined to Los Angeles as most major California newspapers reported the
epidemic correctly and, in Oakland, the State Board of Health even chose to discuss
on
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the epidemic on its weekly radio show. Unabashedly referring to pneumonic plague
as the "celebrated black death of the 14th century, in which one-quarter of the
European population was destroyed," the narrator proceeded to discuss in layman's
terms the three types of plague, bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic, the role of
the flea and the rat, and describe in detail the measures that officials had taken
to contain the epidemic in Los Angeles. Despite the virulence of the pneumonic
variety and the potential danger, concluded the health officer, pneumonic plague
fortunately did not flourish in dry climates, such as Los Angeles, where there is
comparatively little moisture in the air (15).
In Washington, the Public Health Service's Sanitary Board met to discuss the
situation as reported in the Los Angeles dispatches. It was the opinion of the Board
that a ground squirrel and rat survey be made in Los Angeles and neighboring
counties, and especially of Los Angeles' harbor in San Pedro, to determine the
extent of infection. The Board believed that Senior Surgeons Perry and Wayson,
both seasoned and experienced officers, could be relied upon to carry out all neces-
sary procedures and that no detailed instructions needed to be sent to them (16).
II
On November 3, Perry, accompanied by Surgeon Newton Wayson, arrived in
Los Angeles and met with Dr. Dickie, and with representatives of the City and
County Health Departments and the Chamber of Commerce in the office of the
mayor. It was agreed that all plague control work was to be coordinated by an
Advisory Committe composed of Dickie, Perry, and representatives of the City
and County Health Departments and the County General Hospital. In Dickie's
Biennial Report he notes that "all control work" was placed under his direction,
but the records reveal that formal control was not transferred to the State until
November 21. On the 3rd, as a result of the meeting establishing the Advisory
Committee, it is difficult to determine just who was in charge since jurisdictional
disputes were evident from the start, compounded by the fact that only a few weeks
prior to the outbreak, Los Angeles' Health Officer, Dr. Luther Powers, had died
and the City only recently had appointed an acting health officer, Dr. Elmer
Pascoe, in his place (17).
The Advisory Committe on the 3rd issued a plan of operation, which included
the following.
1. Quarantine
2. Restriction of movement within the quarantine area
3. House to house inspection
4. Hospitalization of all contacts
5. Post mortems on all deaths occurring in the quarantine area
6. The establishment of a bacteriological laboratory
7. Hiring a force of men responsible for trapping, poisoning and rat proofing
of buildings
8. Disinfection of households by petroleum spray
9. Tagging of all rats, mice and squirrels by location
10. Eradication of ground squirrels
On the same day, the 3rd, Perry wired Acting Surgeon General White that
Dickie, representing the State Board, appeared to be in charge and that Public
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Health Service personnel were serving in an advisory capacity only. Perry believed
that the community could finance the work and that no additional Public Health
Service representatives were needed at that time (18). White unfortunately did not
receive Perry's cable and sent a rather sharply worded wire which probably had
been prompted by the banner headlines that appeared in the Washington papers,
inquiries from other state health officials and the Secretary of the Treasury, and
White's own untenable position as acting surgeon general in Hugh Cumming's
absence. White wrote as follows.
"Perry. Your failure to report on situation has created very unfavorable impression
for the Service. . You will immediately telegraph full report. . . . Other States
are keenly interested in what is being done to protect them. . . . Bureau depends
on you for information and strict attention to this order is enjoined. You will explain
in your first telegram why you have delayed reporting and give your Los Angeles
address ( 19).
Perry sent White his address in a cable mailed on the 5th and, later that day,
sent another cable describing the control measures taken by the Advisory Commit-
tee (20).
Between the time of the original reprimand to Perry on the 3rd and November
6, Perry continued to wire factual information to Washington. On the 7th, however,
he wrote a three-page letter in which he justified his actions and expressed his
own dissatisfaction with White's apparent lack of confidence in his ability. Perry
wrote that it was he who had recommended the establishment of the Advisory Com-
mittee and sought to coordinate eradication measures; that neither the city nor
the state wanted the Public Health Service to take charge of the operation, espe-
cially since Dickie, believing he was filling the vacuum created by Power's death,
was "keenly desirous" of taking complete control himself; and that the delay in
responding to Washington had been further justified since there was some doubt
that pneumonic plague actually existed! The surgeon who accompanied Perry to
Los Angeles, Dr. Newton Wayson, was an expert in identifying plague organisms
and, upon arriving in the city, went promptly to the hospital to confirm the original
diagnosis. Wayson subsequently reported to Perry that "a few" bipolar organisms
were visible on the prepared slides but since they had been so poorly stained and
since there had been no animal inoculation, he believed, as did the state bacteri-
ologist, W. H. Kellogg, who possessed similar impeccable credentials, that there
was not sufficient bacteriologic evidence upon which to make the diagnosis of plague
(21). On the next day, however, they prepared their own slides from the lungs
of another victim and were able to confirm the disease bacteriologically. Although
both men may have been bacteriological purists, it appears, given the overwhelming
clinical evidence, that neither wished to place himself in a potentially vulnerable
position based on a junior pathologist's poorly prepared slides. With so much at
stake only their own preparations would satisfy them.
Perry concluded his letter to White with a statement that he believed that the
Board should have had confidence in his ability to judge matters and, moreover,
that he had followed accepted Board protocol and procedures. He in no way felt
that his actions were responsible for any embarrassment experienced by White or
the Board. Stopping short of requesting an apology from White, he noted that
subsequent daily reports would follow as soon as accurate information had been
digested and analyzed (22).
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Whether or Inot Perry's letter affected White is not known since Hugh Cumming
returned to Washington and resumed his post as Surgeon General. The letter obvi-
ously had a cathartic affect on Perry, but too much was happening in the early
days of November for Perry to rest easy. Dr. Dickie, for whom Perry earlier had
expressed high regard, soon became the object of Perry's attention and the cor-
respondence from November 7 to mid-December reveals a new conflict: Perry vs
Dickie.
In a telegram sent to Washington on November 10, Perry conveyed certain confi-
dential "personal impressions" about the management of the epidemic. Dickie and
other city and state health officers believed that the epidemic eventually would
be traced to infected squirrels, as it had during the Oakland pneumonic plague
epidemic of 1919 (23). If such was the case, then the epidemic, if localized by
careful quarantine, would be over when the last case was isolated in the hospital.
Prompt containment of the epidemic, wrote Perry, would work to the credit of
Dr. Dickie, whose term had expired and reappointment not yet been made. Perry
might have cited the additional fact that Dr. Pascoe, acting city health officer,
was also interested in a favorable press since he, too, was in line for promotion.
Indeed, there seemed to be developing a growing friction between the three prin-
cipal players, Dickie, Pascoe and Perry (24).
Perry eventually won Dickie over to his position that the outbreak in the Macy
Street District had been the result of rat and not squirrel infection and Dickie subse-
quently emphasized the importance of an extensive and well financed campaign
of rat eradication before the Los Angeles City Council, of which more will be
said shortly. The issue that Perry pressed in his letter of the 10th, however, was
that neither the state nor the city had tne personnel to carry on effective control
measures. Dickie already had stripped his office in San Francisco and no longer
had available personnel for duty in case other communicable diseases became epi-
demic. W. H. Kellogg, the state's only experienced plague bacteriologist, was divid-
ing his time, as was Dickie, between San Francisco and Los Angeles. Moreover,
eradication measures would be very extensive since there were many unsanitary
areas in Los Angeles, few houses that were adequately rat proofed, and there ap-
peared to be a heavy rat infestation. Sooner or later, prophesied Perry, the Service
will be asked to take charge of the work (25).
On November 14, Perry spelled out another area of potential friction; namely,
that his association with Dr. Dickie might lead some to conclude incorrectly that
the Service had a great deal to do with the campaign, whereas, in fact, it had noth-
ing to do with regard to implementation. Dickie freely sought Perry's opinion, as
did Dickie's staff, which only further compromised Perry's and the Service's posi-
tion. If the campaign succeeded, Perry wrote, the State Board of Health would
receive the credit; but if the work did not meet with success, the Service would
be held responsible. Perry recommended, as a way out of the predicament, that
the Board issue a press release that they had cooperated with the State Board
of Health by loaning experienced officers for the formulation of the control and
eradication campaign, but that this having been done, the execution of the plan
rested solely in the hands of the State Board of Health (26).
Perry and Dickie maintained a polite but remote relationship at this time, which
was sweetness and light compared to Dickie's relationship with the acting city
health officer, Dr. Pascoe. On the 21st, Perry informed Washington of the power
struggle that had developed between Pascoe and Dickie as to who would be respon-
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sible for the rat eradication campaign. Despite his earlier reservations about the
resources of the state, Perry recognized that it was in a better position to run the
campaign than the city because the state would be less susceptible to the inevitable
pressures from the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce, who might wish
to end the campaign prematurely in order to restore as soon as possible Los Ange-
les' salubrious image (27). At least the state, wrote Perry, recognized the gravity
and the necessity of a long campaign (28). But there is no doubt that Perry be-
lieved he was choosing between the lesser of two evils.
If Perry was absolutely impartial, he would have recognized earlier the important
role played by Dickie. Perry, for example, had not been present on November
15 when Dickie addressed a meeting attended by the mayor, the City Council and
representatives of the Chamber of Commerce. Before this assembly, Dickie warned
that the plague would bring financial ruin to Los Angeles if prompt action was
not taken. "There is no disease known that has such an effect upon the business
world as plague," he said. The harbor will be quarantined, boats will not be per-
mitted to dock, goods will rot in warehouses, and businesses will go bankrupt as
long as there is even the suspicion of plague. It is imperative he added, that rats
be eradicated and houses be rat proofed. The entire Macy Street area and areas
like it in the city should be condemned and restored so that they would be fit
for human habitation. Dickie concluded that the cost of the clean-up and eradica-
tion campaign would be $500,000. Nothing less will restore the confidence of the
world in Los Angeles than an expenditure of such magnitude, he concluded (29).
It was the threat of a quarantined port, then, that had convinced the Council to
appropriate $250,000, half the sum requested by Dickie, for plague control. It
should be of no surprise that most of the trapping and rat proofing operations
initially took place in the harbor and not in the Macy Street district. Shacks in
the area were indeed condemned and demolished, and dwellings fumigated and
rat proofed but most of the early effort was reserved for the harbor district. Ironi-
cally, the first plague rat in the harbor area was not found until December 29,
trapped on a hog ranch located four miles from the harbor. So intimidated was
the City Council and the Harbor Commission that the ranch was completely demol-
ished and relocated 10 miles from the harbor (30).
On November 28, a meeting arranged by Surgeon General Hugh Cumming, was
held in Los Angeles. In attendance was Surgeon Richard Creel, who was Cum-
ming's personal representative, and Drs. Perry and Dickie. Creel's letter to Cum-
ming presented highlights of the meeting and brought out the following points. First,
Dickie believed that the state could handle the eradication program and the Service
should do nothing to inhibit the state's operation. If the state found itself in diffi-
culty, however, Dickie would be honor bound to let the Service know before March
4, which was the date Congress would adjourn and therefore the last day the Service
could secure necessary funds to take control of operations. Second, that Dickie
had planned to capitalize on the epidemic by seeking additional funds from the
California State Assembly. The state legislature for years had not heeded the State
Board's request for increased appropriations, due largely to the antagonistic attitude
of the governor. Third, since Dickie himself had expressed concern about the lack
of a qualified bacteriologist, he was asked to turn over the laboratory operation
to the Service. Creel believed Dickie might apply to the Service for a bacteriologist
to work on a temporary basis, but Dickie finessed the question. In the back of
his mind he feared the proverbial camel sticking its head under the tent. For reasons
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that were perhaps both chauvinistic and pragmatic, Dickie subsequently was able
to bring Professor Karl Meyer of the University of California into the picture. He
might have reasoned as follows. The state should have complete control; Meyer
is a professor at the state's own University; the legislature would be pleased because
its own employees will be in charge of key operations; their pleasure might be
reflected in larger appropriations to the State Board of Health. Meyer, incidentally,
was agreeable to the plan for reasons of his own. According to Wayson, he saw
himself as the head of a new School of Public Health at Berkeley, which was being
proposed at that time before the state legislature (31). Fourth, the Service in no
way could wrest control from the state since the Service was bound by the 1893
Act authorizing the president ". . . to adopt such measures as in his judgment
shall be necessary to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases, and may detail
or appoint officers for that purpose; but only in the event that the state or the
municipal authorities shall fail or refuse to enforce its own rules and regula-
tions . . ," which Los Angeles and the state had not done. And fifth, quarantine
was justifiable so long as rodent plague existed in Los Angeles. This latter point
was to be raised whenever the campaign seemed to falter (32).
Although Creel seemed sanguine after the meeting, Perry remained skeptical.
His interpretation differed markedly from Creel's. The conference, he wrote, was
"without tangible result." Dickie had not accepted the Service's offer to take over
his laboratory, which both Perry and Wayson believed to be central to the eradica-
tion campaign. Moreover, the fact that Dickie had admitted he might be able to
capitalize on the epidemic to increase the state's appropriations to the State Board
of Health was interpreted by Perry as indicating the baseness of Dickie's motives
(33).
Perry continued in this critical vein in succeeding weeks. He repeatedly returned
to points he had made earlier; namely, that the Service representative in Los Ange-
les be merely an "observer" and not serve in an advisory capacity, that Dickie's
resources were too limited to mount an effective eradication campaign and that
Dickie's motives were based primarily on ambition.
On December 6, Cumming authorized Perry, Creel and Wayson to serve as a
Committee of Three to prepare a formal report on the adequacy of the plague eradi-
cation measures for official Service use (34). The committee completed its report
on December 11 and transmitted its finding to Cumming. Despite Creel's moderat-
ing influence, the report seemed more a reflection of Perry's original positions:
that Dickie was a marginal and absentee administrator; that the supervision of the
campaign was casual and periodic and suffered from the lack of a sustained effort;
that there was precious little cooperation and uniformity of procedure; and that
the scope, practice and efficiency of the field and laboratory work were inadequate.
In view of such conclusions, the Committee of Three recommended that the Service
disassociate itself from the campaign and issue Perry's earlier statement, that the
Service in no way approves of the State's program. An added sentence, somewhat
gratuitous under the circumstances, is indicative of Perry's opinion of Dickie: "It
is apparent that Dr. Dickie does not appreciate the gravity of the situation or the
importance of enlarging the scope of the campaign or of increasing the efficiency
of operations. This is evidenced by his nonacceptance of the proffered concrete
Service aid" (35).
Cumming now had no other recourse than to quarantine Los Angeles' port in
San Pedro. On December 22, he sent a letter to all medical officers in charge of
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quarantine stations declaring San Pedro, and the ports of Oakland and New Orleans,
where plague also had become epidemic, as"plague infected." All vessels departing
from these ports were required to fly a quarantine flag, await inspection upon arriv-
ing at quarantine, and present a port sanitary statement, issued by the medical
officer in charge of the outgoing quarantine station at each of the ports mentioned
(36).
Dr. George Ebright, director of the State Board of Health, was dumbfounded
at the order, but Dickie seemed unperturbed. He assured Ebright that his program
had been effective and asked Ebright to invite Cumming to Los Angeles so that
he might see for himself how wrong Creel, Wayson, and Perry had been (37).
Others, however, reacted predictably. The chairman of the Los Angeles Cham-
ber of Commerce, for example, in a letter to Congressman Robert Armstrong, be-
lieved the Surgeon General's promulgation was "rank discrimination" since the con-
ditions in Los Angeles were in no way analogous to Oakland or New Orleans.
In those ports, he explained, rodent plague was actually on the waterfront, whereas
in San Pedro trapping operations had revealed a catch of astonishing few rats.
Moreover, he wrote, the harbor was located 22 miles from the site of the epidemic,
being connected to the municipality by a narrow, railroad track wide strip of land
that passed through sparsely settled regions. Overlooking the fact that freight trains
and laborers made many round trips between the city and the harbor, the letter
concluded by assuring Armstrong that the Committee of Three's report was "ridicu-
lous" and "without foundation in fact." Heurged that every effort be made in
Washington to remove the quarantine, "as shipping was being seriously affected"
(38).
After the new year, Ebright followed Dickie's advice and invited Cumming to
Los Angeles to acquaint himself personally with the rodent situation (39).
Cumming was agreeable and planned to come immediately. "I have always felt
that if we could get together we could straighten out what appeared to be a rather
awkward situation. . My only purpose has been to assist the state in getting
rid of this condition quickly," Cumming wrote in reply (40).
Cumming did indeed meet with state and local officials but appraised the situa-
tion in the same terms as had Perry. Dickie assured Cumming that he would do
all in his power to correct the items noted in the Committee of Three's report
and that the Service would be called in before March if needed. Cumming returned
to Washington, but despite Dickie's assurances appeared to be as frustrated as Perry
had been. He also believed that the Service should take responsibility for the eradi-
cation program, and for a reason precisely similar to that Perry believed had moti-
vated Dickie: that the Service would be better able to plead its case before Congres-
sional Committee for increased appropriations in order to protect the nation from
dread diseases such as pneumonic plague. In subsequent letters Cumming lamented
the fact that this had been the only epidemic for which the Service had not been
invited by local authorities to take charge (41). It was more than being left out
administratively that concerned Cumming; it was being left out of the dollar
sweepstakes.
During the early months of 1925, the city and the state continued their feud.
Los Angeles had appointed a new health officer, Dr. George Parrish of Oregon,
and letters were written to Cumming wondering why so qualified a man as Parrish
should not be entrusted with the eradication campaign (42).
Cumming's replies were not satisfactory to city officials and they proceeded to
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attempt to discredit the state's program by intimating that the state had misappro-
priated city funds for rat control. The City Council then passed an ordinance en-
abling Parrish to take over the program from the state so as to insure, in their
words, proper expenditure of city funds (43). But once this was done, the Council's
Finance Committee immediately reduced Parrish's budget which severely impeded
the eradication program (44). This is what Perry had feared all along would hap-
pen if the city took control. When Parrish, Dickie, and the Service representative
learned of this maneuver, they petitioned the Council, not to restore the original
budget, but rather to request that the Public Health Service be given control of
the program once and for all. Some seven months after Perry had surmised that
the Service would be called in, Mayor George Cryer sent a letter to President Calvin
Coolidge requesting that the Public Health Service be given responsibility for the
plague eradication program in Los Angeles (45). Within a week of the request,
in July, former Surgeon General Rupert Blue, who had been in charge of the first
plague control program in San Francisco in the early 1900's was recommissioned
as an assistant surgeon general and sent to Los Angeles to take charge (46).
Blue initiated an immediate rat control campaign which was to cost the city and
county of Los Angeles, the County Horticulture Commission, and the state sums
in excess of $400,000. In addition, property owners were to spend over $2,000,000
to comply with new rat proofing ordinances passed at Blue's insistence. Despite
the fact that the mortality rate was relatively small, the amount spent to contain
the epidemic was indeed considerable.
III
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Dr. Dickie, in his Biennial Report
written in 1926, makes no mention of Blue's role in the campaign; nor does he
make mention of Senior Surgeons Perry and Wayson. Instead, Dickie dwelt on
the usual and customary epidemiological features of the epidemic, singling out only
the work of the state epidemiologist who traced the epidemic to a 55-year old
Mexican who had fallen ill on October 1, and his daughter, both of whose symp-
toms had been misdiagnosed. The daughter's "lobar pneumonia," from which she
succumbed on October 5, was actually a secondary plague pneumonia and the
father's "veneral bubo" was bubonic plague. When the father was examined on
October 31, pus was still draining from a sinus at the site of the bubo. Microscopic
examination revealed characteristic plague organisms and animal diagnosis verified
the diagnosis of bubonic plague. Both cases were believed to be the origin of the
series of cases of pneumonic plague in the Macy Street District.
In the conclusion to his report, Dickie wrote this final sentence: "Local, state
and federal officials who have engaged in plague work in California may view with
satisfaction and look back with some degree of pardonable pride on the results
accomplished [here]" (47). One may legitimately ask "whose satisfaction" and
"whose pardonable pride?" Certainly Dr. Pascoe, acting city health officer of
Los Angeles had not been satisfied, since he was passed over for promotion and
eventually discharged by the man hired as health officer, Dr. George Parrish. Nor
can one say that Senior Surgeons Perry and Wayson experienced "pride," pardon-
able or otherwise, since they could not convince state and local officials to give
the Service control of the eradication program from the start. Surgeon General
Cumming's quarantine order, based on the Committee of Three's report, was also
not the proudest day for the Service since one may question his motives as well.
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No infected rats had been found in the harbor when Cumming had declared the
port "plague infected" on December 22, despite the fact that trapping operations
had begun on November 5. The potential for an outbreak to occur in the port, the
need to protect shipping and abide by international sanitary treaty obligations, and
Cumming's own vulnerability, doubtless prompted the order, but it would be diffi-
cult not to assume that the Service also needed a favorable press to maintain its
own image as the health guardian of the nation, a press which would be viewed
favorably by Congressional Committee at annual budget sessions. One even won-
ders if Dr. Dickie believed his own conclusions, for he had been discredited by
both the Service and the Los Angeles press. Yet among his peers within the state,
Dickie emerged as the hero. Dr. James Pomeroy, Los Angeles County health
officer, in 1926 praised Dickie's work on behalf of a beleagured city (48). And,
in 1927, when the State Board of Health evolved into a Department of Public
Health, Dickie was appointed its first full-time director.
If we return to evaluate Dickie's encomium, "that the management of this epi-
demic represented the most outstanding accomplishment of California's health
officers," we appreciate that much more was involved and at stake than the official
reports reveal. Interpreted in this way, Dickie's statement is gratuitous at best and
at the very least misleading, albeit understandably so.
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